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Abstract
This article examines the role of social conflicts in the context ofmigration and discusses the relation between such conflicts
and institutional change. We understand conflicts as tensions that evoke contradiction between different social groups or
institutional actors. Varied urban contexts together with dynamic immigration of heterogeneous population groups can
induce negotiation processes that affect institutional settings and actors. Conflicts have therefore been an integral part
of urban coexistence, and cities have always been places where these conflicts play out. We assume that conflicts are
social phenomena, which have multiple causes and effects. Public assumptions about conflicts in connection with migra-
tion often have a negative or destructive impetus, while conflict theory ascribes to conflicts potential positive effects on
societal change. Conflicts can represent forms of socialization and the possibility of adapting or changing social conditions.
This article discusses the extent to which migration-related conflicts induce institutional change. Using qualitative empiri-
cal results from the BMBF-funded research projectMigraChance, we present a case study that reconstructs the emergence
and course of a conflict surrounding the construction of a Syriac-Orthodox church in Bebra (Hesse) in the 1990s. Analyzing
this conflict both in depth and in relation to its local context, we show that migration is only one part of what we refer to as
migration-related conflicts, and we shed light on the complexity of factors that can result in institutional change. Change
can also occur indirectly, in small steps, and with ambivalent normative implications.
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1. Introduction
In heterogeneous urban contexts and in the course
of dynamic immigration of heterogeneous population
groups, conflicts have always been part of urban coex-
istence. Thus, cities have always been places of con-
flict (Amin, 2002; Valentine, 2008). For that reason, we
consider it necessary to understand the dynamics and
impacts of conflicts, and their role for social develop-
ment. In this article, we will focus on social conflicts
in the context of migration, which we understand as
everyday manifestations of profound societal negotia-
tion processes.
In the German context, the interpretation and impli-
cations of conflicts became the subject of debates in
public media, politics and interdisciplinary scientific dis-
courses in recent years. Several authors in the field
of German migration research see conflicts in connec-
tion with immigration as a sign of successful integra-
tion rather than rising problems. This is a relatively
new perspective that gained popularity within the last
decade. In this interpretation, descendants of migrants
challenge the legitimacy of the hegemonies and insti-
tutions of the host society and therefore, more con-
flicts may arise (El-Mafaalani, 2018; Treibel, 2017a).
Hence, one central aspect of migration research is
the analysis of shifting power relations between long-
established residents and immigrants (Treibel, 2017b).
On the one hand, the rediscovery of the political dis-
pute points to hopes for a revival of democracy and its
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institutions (Mouffe, 2014). On the other hand, it reveals
a demand for an adaptation to the long-denied reali-
ties of migration. Since cities are ultimately the result
of sustained, long-term (im)migration, these effects
must—and should—be found locally, and “institutions,
from administrations to municipal enterprises, muse-
ums, libraries and educational institutions need to
change to pay justice to the ever-growing social diver-
sity. This change has become a matter of survival”
(Terkessidis, 2010, p. 8, authors’ translation).
In the past, the academic and, particularly, the
political debate often ethnicized and culturalized con-
flicts about migration and adopted a focus on problems
(Bommes, 2010). These terms describe the attribution
and reduction of conflicts to ethnic or cultural differ-
ences between groups of people based on their actual
or attributed national, ethnic, cultural or religious back-
ground. For us, migration-related refers less to the fea-
tures assigned to groups or individuals. Our stance on
migration rather examines the negotiations related to it
and to the associated societal and institutional change.
Hence, our approach focuses on conflicts in which a
local society discusses the object of conflict in relation
to migration, where migration becomes a reason itself.
We are thus interested in examining the relationships
between migration, conflict and institutional change.
The expectation that guided our research was that,
in the course of such migration-related conflicts, insti-
tutional change occurs as a process of adaption to new
societal realities. This change, we assumed, would man-
ifest in the creation of new institutions, the adaptation
of existing institutions, the formation of new networks
of actors, or through learning processes in pre-existing
structures. Furthermore, in conflicts, actors would nego-
tiate the validity of norms and values and thereby ques-
tion and reaffirm the legitimacy of existing institutions.
Finally, conflicts can also accompany the establishment
of institutions and negotiate their role and position in a
local society.
Our contribution addresses the question of how the
conflict under investigation—the planned construction
of a Syriac-Orthodox church in the German small town
of Bebra in themid-1990s—influenced local institutional
settings. With this in mind, we review the assumptions
within theories of institutional change and its relation
to conflict and analyze how the aforementioned conflict
became a particularly contentious process. We trace the
complexity of this conflict in detail and reveal how dif-
ferent institutions interacted with its dynamics. To con-
clude, we discuss the interrelationship of conflicts and
institutions with an emphasis on the specific ways they
are intertwined and highlight less expected moments
of change.
2. Conflict, Migration and Institutional Change
Our research interest combines topics rarely associated
with one another in the common body of literature
on conflict theory, migration research and theories of
institutional change. Much is known about institutional
change at the level of nation-states. At the subnational
level, there is growing attention to institutional change
but the field is largely “underexplored” (Evenhuis, 2017,
p. 510) and the same holds true for the municipal level.
Recent years have seen increased interest in the role of
conflict in institutional change especially by institutional
economists (Shami, 2019; Zikos, 2020). However, theo-
ries of institutional change have paid little attention to
conflict theories, whether on a national (Resch, Kersting,
& Müller, 2019) or international level (Mitchell, 2005).
Even though conflict research on a local level paid atten-
tion tomigration, particularly to so-called ethnic conflicts
(Hüttermann, 2000), conflict theory engaged less with
migration despite its inherent interest in drivers of social
change. Migration research, finally, paid attention to the
development of migration-related institutions like for-
eigner’s advisory councils but much less focused on con-
flicts. In order to examine how these topics are related
conceptually, we will review existing theories in the fol-
lowing paragraphs.
Conflict theory attributes certain effects to social con-
flict. Coser (1957) assumes that “no group can be entirely
harmonious” and that therefore “conflict is an essen-
tial element in group formation” (Coser, 1957, p. 31).
Another assumption is that the negotiation of power is a
basic element that “creates [groups’] interests in change
as well as interests in the status quo” (Dahrendorf, 1988,
p. 28). Thus, social conflicts can have an effect on social
structures when goals, values or interests among oppo-
nents are negotiated (Coser, 1957, p. 151). Moreover,
conflicts would lead to “revitalize existent norms; or
[contribute] to the emergence of new norms. In this
sense, social conflict is a mechanism for adjustment of
norms adequate to new conditions” (Coser, 1957, p. 154).
Recent work in conflict theory emphasizes the role
of conflict for democracy (Comtesse, Flügel-Martinsen,
Martinsen, & Nonhoff, 2019). Most prominent here is
the argument supported in the work of Mouffe (2014),
andmore recently in planning theory (e.g., Pløger, 2017):
Democracy is best understood as ‘agonistic pluralism.’
Conflicts cannot—and should not—be eliminated, as the
acceptance and legitimation of conflicts is precisely what
characterizes pluralism, and thus pluralistic democracy
(Mouffe, 2014).
Many scholars define institutions to be either
“formal—such as laws, procedures, contracts, statutes
etc.—or informal—such as norms, conventions, tradi-
tions, routines etc.” (Evenhuis, 2017, p. 511). These for-
mal and informal rules structure the interaction between
actors. Kingston and Caballero (2009) suggest that “insti-
tutions are resistant to change, in part due to people’s
emotional attachment to existing institutions, and in part
because change threatens existing patterns of status,
wealth, and power” (Kingston & Caballero, 2009, p. 166;
Steinmo, 2008, p. 129). However, “There is no consensus
on how to conceptualize either institutions themselves
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or the process of institutional change” (Kingston &
Caballero, 2009, p. 151). Institutional theorists disagree
on assumptions about why institutional change is trig-
gered, often emphasizing stability rather than change.
Kingston and Caballero (2009, p. 156) suggest that “insti-
tutional change is usually incremental since it is often
easier to achieve consensus on small adjustments than
to effect major changes to existing rules.”
Theories of institutional change usually distinguish
between two approaches: intentional design or evolu-
tionary development. Steinmo (2008, p. 133) suggests
that “the evolutionary approach sees outcomes as con-
tingent and non-predictable rather than linear and pre-
dictable.”Mahoney and Thelen (2010, p. 7) point out that
the existing approaches “provide answers to what sus-
tains institutions over time.” This explains why they are
less focused on conflict but on stability. Knight (1992),
however, is an exception along with a small group of
historical institutionalists who “explore power relations
and integrate agency into the analysis rather than see-
ing actors as prisoners of the institutions they inhabit”
(Steinmo, 2008, p. 133). Knight (1992) links institutional
change to the role of distributional conflict and power
asymmetries. He challenges theories that emphasize the
collective benefits of social institutions and instead fol-
lows the idea of the discriminating effects of social insti-
tutions: “According to this alternative approach, social
institutions can be explained in terms of their beneficial
effects on particular segments of the community. It sug-
gests a central focus on the conflict of interests inherent
in distributional questions” (Knight, 1992, p. 8).
We derived three points of interest from the litera-
ture of theories of institutional change. First, the role
of power inequalities; second, the relevance of histori-
cal context; and third, the influence of endogenous and
exogenous factors on the respective object of study.
The study of ‘power inequalities’ as a means of explain-
ing change is relatively common in conflict theory, but
rarely appears in theories of institutional change. Many
authors in this field consider:
Institutional change as a centralized, collective-choice
process in which rules are explicitly specified by a
collective political entity, such as the community or
the state, and individuals and organizations engage
in collective action, conflict, and bargaining to try to
change these rules for their own benefit. (Kingston &
Caballero, 2009, p. 155)
Knight (1992), on the other hand, argues that institu-
tional change can be explained primarily by analyzing
“how the asymmetries of power in a society influence
the evolution of social institutions” (Knight, 1992, p. 14).
This is where conflict theory comes in: “The sociological
theory of conflict would do well to confine itself for the
time being to an explanation of the frictions between the
rulers and the ruled in given social structural organiza-
tions” (Dahrendorf, 1958, p. 173). While Dahrendorf and
Knight point to the necessity to consider power as a rel-
evant category of conflict, Mahoney and Thelen (2010,
p. 8) state that “institutional outcomes need not reflect
the goals of any particular group”; institutional change
can also occur as an unintended consequence. Hence,
power and conflict influence institutions. The “outcome
of conflict among groups” (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010,
p. 8) need not be congruent with the goals of those
involved in the conflict.
It is important to consider history in order to under-
stand past policy decisions as a framework affecting
actors’ identities, their attitudes toward change, their
role in the policy negotiation process, and the array of
viable alternatives (Kingston & Caballero, 2009, p. 156).
On a sub-national level Evenhuis (2017, p. 522) shows
that a path dependency approach “starts from the idea
that changes in institutions build on and are conditioned
by already existing institutions, through a dynamic and
ongoing process.” Because of its particular attention to
context and path dependence, historical institutionalism
can be inspiring here. From its perspective, behavior, atti-
tudes, and strategic decisions take place within a par-
ticular social, political, economic, and cultural context.
History is not understood as a sequence of independent
events. Rather, historical institutionalism emphasizes
how different factors influence each other—therefore,
authors of this body of literature are interested in the
interdependencies and the multidimensionality of fac-
tors (Kingston & Caballero, 2009, p. 128): “Thus, by deep-
ening and enriching their understanding of the historical
moment and the actors within it, [these theorists] are
able to offer more accurate explanations for the specific
events that they explore” (Steinmo, 2008, p. 127).
Exogenous influences, like shocks, can be the impe-
tus for institutional change (Kingston & Caballero, 2009,
p. 168). Since institutions tend to be stable until con-
fronted with them (Steinmo, 2008, p. 129), these insti-
tutions and involved actors need skills and routines to
deal with exogenous influences. On an institutional level,
little is known about these skills and routines. Thus,
Kingston and Caballero (2009) pay attention to the indi-
vidual level to analyze how actors process complex infor-
mation. According to them, actors constantly process
exogenous influences with the help of their bounded
rationality. Forms of bounded rationality include com-
munications skills, information processing skills, calcu-
lation skills, preference formation skills, and emotional
skills. Consequently, institutions are considered the
result of intentional human problem solving (Kingston &
Caballero, 2009, p. 175). Kingston and Caballero however
conclude that “further theoretical and empirical work is
needed to clarify the role of bounded rationality, of col-
lective and individual learning, and of endogenous pref-
erences as drivers of, or impediments to, institutional
change” (Kingston & Caballero, 2009, p. 178).
Initially, we conducted our research under the
assumption that conflicts would provide stimulus for
institutional change. Instead, we found that examining
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conflict alone is not enough to understand change.
Rather, for social conflicts the aforementioned inter-
play of power asymmetries, changing historical contexts,
and the influence of exogenous factors and endogenous
capacities helps to explain change.
3. Methods
Our contribution is based upon studies carried out as
part of the BMBF-funded research project MigraChance
(2018–2021). This project examines migration-related
conflicts and their impact on institutional change in
the three cities of Leipzig, Gelsenkirchen and Bebra.
Research includes the reconstruction of two migration-
related conflicts in each case study.
For Bebra, we analyzed the conflict over the Syriac-
Orthodox church because it has been the main con-
flict around migration in this town, and everyone we’d
ask about migration-related conflicts would mention the
story of the church. The empirical data for our conflict
analysis was gathered using a mixed-method approach,
including qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2002);
15 guided interviews (Przyborski & Wohlrab-Sahr, 2014)
with people involved in the conflict in the mid-1990s;
20 further on-site conversations; two local workshops;
and data from personal and official archives as well as
local newspapers. Further analyzed documents include
draft resolutions; extracts from building and planning
committees; district council resolutions; and documents
like personal letters and notes. Based on these materials,
we analyzed and mapped the elements of the conflict to
understand its dynamics and institutional effects (Fisher,
Abdi, & Ludin, 2007).
Generally speaking, we regard the reconstruction of
conflicts as a difficult endeavour, since narratives sur-
rounding them always represent certain perspectives.
These narratives differ according to the position of speak-
ers and represent a retrospective viewofwhat happened.
Therefore, there can never be a ‘correct version’ of the
story of a conflict. This reveals that conflicts are diffi-
cult to describe merely in terms of ‘what happened.’
Conflict stories are perspective-based narratives of the
experienced course of events. Being aware of this poten-
tial pitfall, we first describe the historical context of the
case study and briefly introduce the circumstances under
which the Syriac-Orthodox community found its way to
Bebra. Focusing on the year 1996, we will then out-
line the polarizing conflict and include the main lines of
the arguments in the debates. Following this, we reflect
which social issues were negotiated during the course of
the conflict, and which institutional changes occurred.
4. Case Study Bebra: Historical Context
Bebra is a small town in Northern Hesse with approx-
imately 14,000 inhabitants (Hessian Land Statistical
Office, 2020). Because of its location in the center of
Germany, Bebra was one of the most important railway
hubs up until 1990 (Budnik et al., 2020). When Germany
was still divided, Bebra was one of eight border-crossing
points and handled the inter-zone passenger and freight
traffic between the Federal Republic of Germany and
the German Democratic Republic. For readers unfamil-
iar with the context—after World War II, Germany had
been divided into two states (1949–1990): the Federal
Republic of Germany in the west and the German
Democratic Republic in the east. Bebra was able to main-
tain a role as an important railway junction even dur-
ing the division, despite its location at the edge of the
Western zone. In addition, the municipality benefited
financially from the so-called ‘marginal zone funding.’
The so-called ‘zonal border area’ received a high level
of spatial planning attention and special funding within
the framework of regional structural policy in order to
compensate for the disadvantages caused by its location.
This came to an endwith reunification in 1990.Moreover,
with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and construc-
tion, undertaken by the German Railway Corporation, of
a new railway transit structure that passes Bebra with-
out stopping there, the city lost its role for rail traffic.
A process of deindustrialization began. The result was a
significant loss of jobs. Where the German railway com-
pany once employed up to 4,000 people in the city, today
only a few hundred workers remain (Tom, FormerMayor,
Interview, 2018, October 16).
Bebra has had a long history of international immi-
gration and with it a relatively high share of migrants
for a small town. The first documented immigration to
Bebra took place due to the expansion of the railway net-
work in 1849 (Meng, 1969). One century later, follow-
ing the recruitment agreements of the federal govern-
ment with Italy in 1955 and even more so after similar
agreements with Greece, Spain and Turkey in the early
1960s, immigration of migrant workers developed fur-
ther, also in Bebra. These agreements aimed at meeting
increased demand for labor in a timeof economic growth
and initiated the immigration of hundreds of thousands
of so-called ‘foreign guest workers’ to Germany, whose
stay was supposed to be temporary. Due to the so-called
oil crisis and a worsening economy a ‘recruitment ban’
came into force in 1973 and many so-called ‘guest work-
ers’ returned to their countries of origin. Still, the over-
all number of immigrants grew through the process of
family reunification—as long as they were working in
Germany, guest workers had the right to bring their fam-
ilies. The migrants who stayed increasingly rented or
bought apartments in Bebra’s inner-city neighborhoods,
where comparatively cheap and less attractive living
space was available.
From 1980 forward, asylum was the primary means
by which migrants arrived. This was the result of an
increase in forced migration, but also resulted from
the lack of other legal possibilities for immigration to
Germany. Later, the number of asylum-seeking Syriac-
Orthodox Christians from Turkey rose to comprise
30%–40% of the total number of refugees (Sven, Former
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Head of the Workers’ Welfare Organization, Interview,
2019, June 25). Many of the latter already had some
local contacts reaching back to Germany’s guest worker
period. In the early 1990s the share of the foreign
population in Bebra was twice as high as in neighbor-
ing communities. From the 2000s onwards, the propor-
tion of the foreign population decreased. Immigrants
partly received German citizenship plus their children
were born as German citizens, and also due to shrink-
ing refugee migration to Germany, and an increasingly
restrictive border regime. As a result of its enduring
migration history, people from over 80 nations and
their offspring are presently living in Bebra. While offi-
cial local statistics encompass only the category of
‘foreigner,’ city officials assume 60% of newborns have a
so-called ‘migration background’ when the national ori-
gin of grandparents has been taken into account (Tim,
Former Director of the Local Youth Center, Interview,
2018, September 19).
The first members of the Christian Syriac-Orthodox
community migrated to Bebra over the course of sev-
eral decades from the Tur Abdin region at the border
of Turkey and Syria. They first came as ‘guest workers’
between 1961 and 1973, while the worker agreement
between Germany and Turkey was still in place. They
later brought their families, enlarging the community
within Germany through family reunification. Between
1973 and 1986, additional Syriac-Orthodox Christians
applied for asylum, as the Turkish Muslim majority
increasingly pressured Christians in the Tur Abdin region.
In a key decision, the Hessian administrative court recog-
nized the Christians living in the southeastern provinces
of Turkey as being a persecuted group. According to the
court, they were exposed to massive attacks by Turkish
security forces because they, like the Kurdish civilian pop-
ulation, were suspected of supporting the PKK (Kurdistan
Workers’ Party, founded in 1978, which tried to separate
from Turkey in order to establish an independent Kurdish
state; “Turkish Christians are entitled to asylum,” 1995;
for a detailed overview and presentation of the empir-
ical material, see Budnik et al., 2020). As persecuted
Christians, there was no way back to Turkey for most of
them. 143 Syriac-Orthodox Christians acquired German
citizenship between 1985 and 1995 (City of Bebra, 1996).
5. The Conflict about the Construction of a
Syriac-Orthodox Church
Since the 1970s, the Syriac-Orthodox community had
been practicing their faith in the local Catholic Church
upon the invitation of local Catholic leaders. The commu-
nity began thinking about constructing their own church
building in 1990, and they eventually bought farmland in
1994 with the help of the local Catholic and Protestant
churches. There was no development plan for the pur-
chased land. Therefore, the city of Bebra had to approve
the change in land use status so that the building project
could be implemented. At the beginning of 1996, the
decision on the change of the land-use plan was due for
a vote by the city council.
The body rejected the change. The city council at
first mainly addressed planning issues, e.g., the size
of the project, traffic issues with agricultural vehicles
and parking problems. Opponents of the project quickly
expanded the topics to aspects of inter-ethnic and inter-
religious conflicts and fears regarding living together. In a
speech on behalf of the Christian Democratic Union,
a city councilor pointed to the growing number of
Muslims and Kurds and suggested that “gatherings of
several thousand people with their religious opposites
[have] a negative impact on our city, [and therefore]
the local population is overwhelmed with that many
cultural and religious contrasts” (City of Bebra, 1996b).
A letter from the Syriac-Orthodox community to the
Christian Democratic Union reconfirmed their intention
to build a Christian church and not a mosque (Syriac-
Orthodox Community, 1996). Additionally, they pointed
out that “half of our parishioners are German citizens—
with all duties and with all rights” (Syriac-Orthodox
Community, 1996).
The atmosphere heated up. Public reporting and
the mobilization of networks quickly expanded the cir-
cle of actors involved as well as the range of conflict
issues addressed. Rapidly, the supporters’ side orga-
nized itself and began building alliances beyond ques-
tions of national belonging in favor of religious belonging.
The conflict polarized the urban society, which became
clear through the twopublic information events inMarch
and April 1996 at the latest. Contrary to the intention to
contain the conflict, both events resulted in further hard-
ening of the fronts, emotional stress and mutual accusa-
tions as this impression of a participant shows:
As a young person, there were tears in my eyes
that evening. Supporters of the community center
were booed, and were even interrupted….A look at
the faces around me revealed such anger, such rage,
[which] I have never experienced before. (“Never
experienced such anger,” 1996)
The dynamic led to increased threats and intimida-
tion, especially against supporters of the church. They
were increasingly “publicly insulted and harassed with
anonymous threatening phone calls” (Schaake, 1996).
The number of public statements by local but also
external politicians, private individuals and institutions
increased significantly after the event.
Internal and external pressure on the local actors,
and especially the newly appointed mayor (Christian
Democratic Union), who has been elected in September
1995 and came into office in March 1996, increased.
Proponents of the church repeatedly demanded objec-
tivity. For example, the Green Party stated that “the
polemical stirring up of emotions must be removed from
the arsenal of political debate” (“Do not stir up emo-
tions,” 1996), and the Social Democratic Party warned
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against an “emotional occupation of the topic” (“SPD
warns,” 1996). Letters to the local newspaper, the mayor,
and public letters from politicians with polarizing and
emotional content appeared in the local press. A head-
line in the local newspaper about the search for a
“home for the suffering church” can serve as one exam-
ple of the charged atmosphere (“Planned community,”
1996). Readers’ letters said they were “horrified” that
a Christian party was refusing a Christian church and
commented that fear is “not a good advisor” (“CDU to
refuse construction of a new church,” 1996). Supporting
and opposing petitions followed. In addition, the church-
supporting supra-regional media attention also grew.
In 1996, one of the largest nationwide news services,
Der Spiegel, ran a headline referencing a threatening
phone call made to the head of the city parliament,
a supporter of the church (“We’ll set your house on
fire,’’ 1996).
The process so far had shown that public debate
quickly escalated, making it difficult to find a solution or
compromise. Politicians attempted to keep the topic out
of the public. Therefore, further negotiations at the so
called ‘roundtable’ took place in sessions closed from the
general public and media. Participants agreed that only
the moderator should inform the press about the sta-
tus of negotiations. With the participation of representa-
tives from the Social Democratic Party and the Christian
Democratic Party, the mediating churches and the Syriac
Orthodox Christians, the congregation made new con-
cessions regarding size and location of the church build-
ing. They joined forces to look for alternative locations.
Eventually, the Christian Democratic Union got out of
the negotiations and refused any further participation,
which sidelined the issue until after upcoming munici-
pal elections in 1997 (Protestant Church Council, 1996).
After four sessions, the roundtable eventually failed in
the summer of 1996, although the opponents had grad-
ually gotten closer to reaching a compromise.
Public attention and excitement subsided. Almost
all parties avoided raising the issue of the project in
their election campaigns, thus preventing further esca-
lation. Negotiations continued—albeit without the pub-
lic’s knowledge—and the town administration examined
alternative locations. From this point on, it is difficult to
reconstruct further negotiations andmediations since no
documents or media coverage are available, and inter-
viewees would jump directly to the results of the reso-
lution in their reconstructions. As far as we know, talks
between the mayor and the Syriac-Orthodox commu-
nity continued. Neither side made any statements to the
press or the public on the status of the negotiations.
In November 1997, the city council presented a com-
promise for the controversial church building: the con-
version of the vacant former Federal Railway School, a
training center for railway apprentices. Due to its loca-
tion in the inner-city area, approval from the political
parties in the city council was not required. After a
year full of polarization, a lot of pressure and dissent
from outside for the local decision-makers, and some
much needed time for rest and silence, almost all sides
considered this location a success. The new location
simultaneously opened up the possibility of giving in to
public pressure and finding peace without losing face.
The decision-makers, and above all the mayor, framed
the compromise as a “good solution for everyone” from
the start (Tom, Former Mayor, Interview, 2018, October
16). In particular, themayor emphasized the urban devel-
opment advantages for the city and minimized the prob-
ability of further conflicts. The open conflict came to an
end at this point.
In 2002, the conversion of the Federal Railway School
into a church was finally completed. Positive portray-
als dominated the press and the statements of political
decision-makers like the former mayor who stated that
“everyone is satisfied” (Tom, Former Mayor, Interview,
2018, October 16). One journalist described the church
building as a “highlight in the cityscape [which] is at the
same time anupgrade for Bebra” (“Newchurch to be con-
secrated tomorrow,” 2002). His editorial on the church
building begins with the words:
The windows and doors were smashed, the roof
broken—an eyesore in the middle of Bebra. The
former Federal Railway School on Eisenacherstrasse
in Bebra was threatened with becoming an eternal
ruin. But thanks to the commitment of the Syriac-
Orthodox Church and cultural association, the build-
ing has become a jewel. (“Joy over their own place of
worship,” 2002)
6. Institutional Change
We will now discuss several aspects of institutional
change related to this conflict, beginning with the role of
institutions in the conflict dynamics. Following this, we
will examine how the conflict correlates with changes
in institutions with respect to the three dimensions
derived from the literature review. In doing so, we will
first consider the role of power asymmetries in the
intended design of an institution for immigrants and,
second, include the importance of alliance building for
the implementation of the project. Thirdly, we take
into account the institutional ways of dealing with the
conflict, e.g., the role of the chosen dialogue formats.
This endogenous procedure was influenced by exoge-
nous forces on local institutional decision-making levels.
Fourth, we will discuss short-term and long-term, small-
scale institutional change and associated development
of institutions.
The changing historical context in part explains
the emergence of the manifest conflict. This changing
context—meaning exogenous influences on local condi-
tions like immigration or political change—challenged
fixed institutional frameworks. Core aspects of the histor-
ical change in the 1990swere the intense process of dein-
dustrialization due to German reunification, the loss of
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Bebra’s importance as a national railway junction (periph-
eralization), increasing refugee migration to Germany
and Bebra, and the long-lasting stigmatization and deval-
uation of Bebra as a ‘Turks town’ (or worse) since the
1970s. Further, the nationwide racist discourses have to
be taken into account—riots and mobilizations against
migrants had begun already in the 1980s and peaked at
the beginning of the 1990s, resulting in the implementa-
tion of far more restrictive immigration laws. For years,
a controversial public and political debate on interna-
tional immigration to Germany, recognition of the real-
ity of post-war immigration (which conflicted with self-
perception of an ethnically homogenous national state),
and the conditions and future of the multicultural soci-
ety had been going on at the national level. This broad
discourse also dominated the 1995 mayoral campaign
in Bebra, where the rejection of further immigrants and
planned construction of a mosque had been controver-
sially debated.
Conflicts like the case of the Syriac-Orthodox church
reflect societal negotiation processes around local urban
development in an increasingly plural society with chang-
ing balances of power. In the foreground of the conflict
stands the intentional establishment of a religious insti-
tution, the Syriac-Orthodox church and community cen-
ter. With regard to immigration, local politics is perme-
ated by hegemonic claims of the host society. At the
same time, it shows that the host society itself is divided
between support for and rejection of a religious center
to be built by immigrants. The immigrant group is sur-
prised that these hegemonic claims and their enforce-
ment are directed against them. At the same time, they
also have allies with influence and power, namely the
local churches. The alliance of Christian churches and
Syriac-Orthodox immigrants also brings a powerful argu-
ment to the center of the discussion: the claim that the
shared Christian religion is a more powerful source of
legitimacy than the question of geographical origin. This
is evident in the Syriac-Orthodox Christians’ emphasis
that they were building a church and not a mosque, thus
hinting at a common line of identity. In this way, the
emphasis on religious affiliation is used powerfully to set
oneself apart from supposed religious minorities.
The conflict is an example of how exogenous and
endogenous parameters influence local institutions and,
therefore, the dynamics of the local conflict. Institutions
like the municipal administration and government were
challenged in dealingwith the conflict. Exogenous param-
eters included, on the one hand, the increasing exter-
nal pressure of social organizations, churches, NGOs
and civil society actors, and alliances between regional
and national institutions. The media, yet another insti-
tutional actor, played a key role. On the other hand,
national and local laws were decisive. Building laws,
togetherwith the exact location of the envisioned church
project, induced administrative procedures, which pro-
longed the planning process and made the church a mat-
ter for the local government. A different location for the
property would have resulted in different procedures,
and an inner city location enabled rapid construction of
the church. The dynamics of the conflict were fueled
by campaigns in the coinciding mayoral election, which
only took place due to a change in regional law. For the
first time, the mayor was to be elected directly by the
local citizens.Migration became amajor issue in the elec-
tion campaigns and preventing the construction of the
Syriac-Orthodox church served as a litmus test for the
Christian Democratic Union candidate who won. A big
part of his success was rooted in the promises made
about preventing further international immigration.
Skills and routines of actors in institutions such as
election periods, public hearings and participation, and
internal political competition intersected with the pro-
cess of planning and deliberating on the church project.
One such routine is to address conflicts with the orga-
nization of a public hearing. Here, a major endogenous
learning process occurred because the hearings unin-
tentionally contributed to the escalation of the conflict.
The result was that institutions turned away from the
general public; negotiations continued in camera with-
out any external communication to the regional press
or other external actors, thus shutting off external influ-
ences. The concept of bounded rationality may help
explain this learning process. It may explain why the
actors insisted on their veto of changes to the land-use
plan, as they had a limited sense of the scope the conflict
would bring to the city. It may explain the general popula-
tion’s resistance to change and their assumption that city
politicians had to implement their desires, since politi-
cians are believed to embody the will of the electorate
(which opposed further immigration to the city). On the
individual level, actors have learned that their skills to
assess how the conflict would develop under increasing
external influences are limited; and they have learned
that their routines for orientation, their skills for commu-
nication and ways of handling information are limited,
too. On an institutional level, institutions have learned
to close themselves to the outside world in response to
exogenous influences.
In the presented case, we saw an institutionaliza-
tion of short-term formats like roundtables and infor-
mation events, which aimed to resolve tensions but
failed to do so. Long-term formats for encounters and
exchanges were initiated, such as festivities and cultural
exchanges like the ‘intercultural weeks,’ which continue
to exist even after the manifest conflict has subsided.
On the initiative of the Baptist pastor, it was decided
to hold a joint prayer for the “peace process” (Ralph,
member of a local religious community, Interview, 2019,
July 15). Long-term establishment of dialogical formats,
especially those with the goal of promoting ‘intercul-
tural exchange’ like the working group Intercultural Life,
were composed of representatives from different parties
and faith communities. The foundation of these formats
needed committed and strongly networked individuals.
Years after the conflict, the former youth center director
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was brought into the city’s administration to fill the
position for ‘intergenerational coexistence.’ He is consid-
ered a key figure in communication with migrant youth
and families of all origins. With the help of his network
function, the city administration acts at the interface
between civil society, administration and politics. The
most obvious institutional change is the Syriac-Orthodox
church itself and the associated change of the immi-
grant’s role in local society. Today, the community is a
recognized part of the urban society. Thanks to them
and other establishedmigrant communities, the city was
able to deal successfully andwithout larger conflicts with
increasing arrivals of refugees from 2015 onwards. This
growth has also led to a demographic stabilization of
the number of inhabitants, which had been decreasing
continuously in the years prior, following the regional
trend. In the wake of this development, the city today
represents itself as a ‘prime example of integration’ in
the region.
7. Conclusion
In the course of migration-related conflicts, institutional
change occurs as a process of adaptation to shifting soci-
etal realities, and has to be considered part of a broader
societal transformation. Conflict stimulates a sometimes
reluctant development of institutions (Steinmo, 2008).
Our example shows that this change is not always spec-
tacular and obvious. The analysis of institutions shows a
tendency to refuse change and to keep the status quo
after successfully dealing with conflicts. An immediate
and direct effect on institutions and their development
is hardly clearly visible. Accordingly, processes of insti-
tutional learning and change do not necessarily mani-
fest themselves in a formally documentable way. They
are rather gradual, small-scale and difficult-to-observe
informal changes (e.g., change in action strategies, with-
out direct restructuring or reorganization of institutions).
According to Kingston and Caballero (2009), the com-
mon ways that institutions respond to challenges are
shaped by external parameter shifts. We assume that,
during the course of conflicts, there is always a complex
structure of influencing external and endogenous factors
that lead to iterative change processes in institutions
(unless it is a matter of intentional design ‘from above’).
Institutional learning includes both the establishment of
temporary exchange formats designed to resolve imme-
diate conflict as well as long-term local meeting net-
works. It also includes strategic refusal to communicate,
increasingly non-transparent action and the evasion of
established institutions as a reaction towards exoge-
nous influences.
In migration-related conflicts, actors negotiate the
validity of norms and values (Coser, 1957) as well as
locally changing power relations (Dahrendorf, 1958), by
questioning and reaffirming the legitimacy of existing
institutions. This negotiation is particularly linked to a
changing social and historical context. The analysis of
the context indicates that migration itself is only one
aspect—without necessarily being a condition—of the
conflict’s emergence. The simultaneity of experiences
of crisis due to national and local societal changes thus
influenced perceptions of immigration, and the ability to
negotiate the changing roles of both long—and newly-
established citizens. In this sense, migration-related con-
flicts can be understood as struggles over power (Knight,
1992), such as the local immigrants’ push for recognition
and participation. It is a struggle over the resources of
participation and co-determination of further local devel-
opment. These conflicts are processes determined by
structural path dependencies, collective emotions, spa-
tial conditions, values and attitudes, actors, their inter-
ests and relationships, and supra-regional discourses.
The subsequent complexity of the conflict impedes the
ways institutions will handle conflict.
Furthermore, well-known and established institu-
tions of conflict resolution, like public information events
and roundtables, can stand in the way of a more funda-
mental institutional change. To a limited extent, these
tools are suitable to handle conflicts. However, their use
in conflict situations is not always appropriate due to
the emotional character of public conflicts. An informa-
tion event can thus lead to open polarization and emo-
tional stress, but does not provide the tools to deal
with this. Negotiation is suppressed through the claim of
objectivity (that resides in the instruments). Even though
it contradicts common assumptions regarding commu-
nicative and participative planning, we observe that cit-
izens’ assemblies—as a type of institution for conflict
resolution—can ultimately lead to further polarization
instead of conflict resolution.
We consider the connection of conflicts and insti-
tutions to be relational in both directions at different
scales. We observe interdependent, ambivalent inter-
action that co-produces these very conflicts and insti-
tutions. Conflict-solving institutions like roundtables or
public hearings can contribute to the escalation of con-
flict dynamics rather than containing them. This dynamic
is rooted in the intrinsic character of these formats.
On the one hand, they are meant to serve the objective
discussion of controversial public issues. On the other
hand, they trigger polarization and emotionalization of
social debates. Institutional formats for dealing with con-
flicts focus primarily on the rational side of conflict res-
olution and exclude debates about emerging emotions.
The unspoken emotional injuries linger as latent ten-
sions and thus further fuel the conflict. The analysis of
migration-related conflicts can point out such grievances
and draw attention to their effects on local societies and
institutions. It remains an outstanding task to integrate
the perspectives of emotional conflict resolution into
existing institutional frameworks.
The analysis of local migration-related conflicts
provides insights into the complex interdependencies
between migration, conflict and institutional change.
The analysis also reveals the difficulty in understanding
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institutional change over a short period of observation.
Institutional change is often a result of long-lasting pro-
cesses rather than a sudden development. Research of
local migration-related conflicts needs more scientific
attention in order to better understand the role of his-
torical context, changes in local power relations, and the
inclusion of endogenous and exogenous influences on
institutional change. For this purpose, more local empir-
ical research should be conducted in the thematic field
while also taking the emotional side of conflicts into con-
sideration. The theoretical landscapewould benefit from
a dialogue between conflict theory and theories of insti-
tutional change inmodern immigration societies in order
to explain how local urban societies are subject to perma-
nent institutional change.
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